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ALSACE-LORRAINE  
OR  
THE STRUGGLE of 2000 YEARS

AS POINTING TO A NEW BASIS  
FOR  
PEACE AMONG NATIONS

By  
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## THE CHALLENGE

The war has not been imposed upon us by others and by surprise. We have willed the war. It was our duty to will it. We decline to appear before a tribunal of united Europe. We reject its jurisdiction. One principle alone counts and no other—one principle which contains and shows up all the others—*might*.

—MAXIMILIAN HARDEN, October, 1914

## THE REPLY

When the truth of to-day's launchings percolates to the German people they will know that their leaders have deceived them; that Americans have their sleeves rolled up and we have our fighting blood up; that we are going to win this war if it takes the last man, the last ounce of strength, last resource and the last dollar that this country possesses.

—CHARLES M. SCHWAB, July 4 1918.

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Republic free, thy Stars shall shine  
Where Freedom forms her battle-line,  
And light with hope the midnight sky,  
Till all shall see the dawn draw nigh  
Who Freedom's battle fight once more,  
As fought their gallant sires of yore.

O, broad thy Stripes and bright thy Stars,  
And sweet thy life when prison bars  
Are gone, with tyrants overthrown,  
And nations come into their own;  
And Freedom needs her friends no more  
To fight as fought their sires of yore.

—TIPLADY; from "The Cross at the Front."

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# Alsace-Lorraine

and

## Peace Among the Nations

We seek a lasting peace; we seek it through war because only through a war of self defense and in maintenance of the fundamental rights of nations does such a peace seem possible. We seek a just, an honorable peace, in which wrongs shall be righted; conditions either restored or created under which for all time the warring nations can trust each other, deal with mutual respect and advantage, and no more rely on great armies, fleets of dreadnaughts, battle cruisers and such engines of death and destruction. These are world objects and in the official declarations of the President of the United States they have been given first place. The same may be said of the declarations of the Pope. This great, this universal objective, is to a greater or less extent, in view of all the nations; if not of their rulers, it at least has dawned or begins to dawn upon the masses. Cyclops may have but one eye but he can see that he ought not and need not sweat and tug forever under the burdens of war.

The more universal the object; the greater it looms and the smaller in comparison becomes the great number of objects and ambitions of the nations that cluster around it and are in danger of beclouding it. These objects may be national in their scope; but we ascend into the commonwealth of nations and expect some attending sacrifices. Not without pain did the thirteen colonies yield some part of their independence to the United States and accept a limited sovereignty; but not without pain would they see their rights again restored. In no war known to history have the issues, the conflicting rights and national ambitions, been so numerous and, perhaps, so involved. It goes without saying that no settlement, permanent, satisfactory in the long run, and marking a decided advance in world politics, can be made without sacrifice on the part of some, and perhaps of all, the contending nations. Not a sacrifice of men and money; this now goes awfully on while the voices of the dead cry for a new earth. But among the things that go to the scrap heap, or ought to go, will be some political tenets, some national ambitions, even some cherished ideals, along with some na-

tional whims, fancies, and darling things possessed which are inconsistent with the moral unity implied in a non-political or semi-political union of nations. At the end of every street fight there should be a forgive and forget; or at least the mutual sacrifice of some pocketed pride. It will probably be thus at the institution of any league of peace if its purposes are realized.

To look at the matter in the concrete.

First, as if moral discipline were attainable only by a great standing army with enormous armaments, as has been the case with Germany, consisting of recruits and reserves molded and directed by an oppressive militarism, a consciousnessless military machine,

“a monster of so frightful mien  
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen,”

the nations have yet to learn that to arm for self defense is right and to arm for conquest deserves the social and economical boycott of the civilized world. Every humane, christianly civilized person can join with Eucken in words spoken to a friend of the writer some years before the war, “We hate Prussian militarism” (“*Wir hassen Prussien militarisms*”). When this monster appears, breathing fire and belching poisonous gas, it is as much the duty of the civilized world to confine and crush it as for a village community to cage or kill a lion escaped from a menagerie. The safety of the world requires it and the world must be so adjusted to the legitimate aspirations of the nations that in a half-century Germany itself would have no regrets, even as the South does not today mourn the downfall of slavery.

Again, as was said by Amos, professor of jurisprudence in University College, London, in his “Political and Legal Remedies for War,” (1880) “England is regarded as the stronghold of the doctrine which admits of the capture of private persons and property at sea, while disallowing it on land. Every European state, as well as the United States of America, has at one time or another, publicly advocated the opposite doctrine; or has adopted the principle of reciprocity, or has already afforded a precedent for exempting private property at sea from capture, as in the case of the war of 1866, between Austria and Prussia, in alliance with Italy and in the war of France and England with China, in 1860. The most notable expression of the English view is that given by Lord Palmerston in 1860 when he announced that, in his opinion, the existence of England depended upon the maintenance of her empire over the sea and the capture of the merchant ships and seamen of states with which she was at war was essential to this end.” Thus “it is with good reason that England is regarded as the stronghold of the doctrine which admits of the capture of private persons and property at sea, while disallowing it on land,” and in a strong argument the author proceeds to contradict this view. In “*Mare Liberum*” (London, 1917) Ramsay Muir, professor of history in the University

of Manchester, England, contrasting the German and American view, declares the American doctrine to be "simpler, bolder and more honest; and it is fair to say that it has been consistently maintained by American publicists since 1783. It was that all private property, whether ship or cargoes, and whether enemy or belligerent, should be exempt from seizure or destruction; but that goods destined for a belligerent government should (if contraband, as such goods practically always are) be liable to seizure and confiscation. This is the American doctrine of freedom of the seas, which has been preached ardently by President Wilson. If the allies win it is likely that the British interpretation of the freedom of the seas will be established. As for the American view, it is unlikely to be adopted unless America is able to dictate terms of peace." In other words somebody has got to sacrifice something in the way of political principle for the sake of peace. Yet it may be said that if peace is of the kind sought by the League to enforce Peace, the sacrifice will not be so great after all. While Britain takes pride in her "command of the sea" no self-respecting American can listen with patience to Thomson's ditty, "Britannia rules the seas." So long as she does so upon the principles now maintained we must hope for her friendly disposition and in case of trouble be content to hide behind her skirts.

Again, it is not likely that the Philippines will play any part in the peace settlement. Should they chance to do so, the United States cannot afford to disregard its pledges and principles. Nothing but foolish vanity is contained in the saying "Where the flag once goes up it shall never come down;" on the other hand if for power or pelf we abandon the principle of self government for the islands as soon as they can receive it, even with the turbulence through which our predecessors worked up to a balanced freedom, we deserve no stars in our flag.

Again, and in the last place, seeking for concrete instances of possible yielding of assumed national rights for the good of all, and entering upon the chief purpose of this essay, we approach the age-long dispute over Alsace-Lorraine, which is not unlikely to be a very difficult question in the settlement. On nothing, apparently, is the national heart more set, either in France or Germany, than the getting or keeping of Alsace-Lorraine. President Wilson has officially spoken of this matter as having disturbed the peace of Europe long before the present war. Inasmuch as France was the only nation concerning itself particularly with Alsace-Lorraine, except as Germany was bothered in its government and committed inexcusable blunders in connection therewith, this amounts to saying that we have got into a war fomented by France and begun by Germany. This does not sound well but allowing for the other questions involved, there is truth in it. Nevertheless, our entrance, on entirely disconnected grounds, was both justifiable and inevitable.

The question of Alsace-Lorraine plays so great a part in the



causes of the war and is liable to play so great a part in its end that it is worth while to examine all the facts, and determine, each for himself, the comparative importance of this issue in its relation to the greater question of a peace on a new and true basis. From French utterances it would seem that the restoration of the provinces was a necessary condition of any peace; German utterances indicate that to give up the provinces would be an impossible dismemberment of the empire. In a state paper the president has expressed his opinion that the wrong of Alsace-Lorraine must be righted. In just what the wrong consists and how it should be righted he has not fully explained. It is the purpose of this paper to lay out the facts, leaving conclusions to the reader.

Ordinarily, in warfare, the so-called *status quo ante*, or condition of things as were at the beginning of the conflict, especially if settled by treaty, is taken as the starting point of a new peace. For the sake of quiet things must be considered as settled sometime and there is no statute of limitations in international law. The *res judicata*, the thing settled, dates from the fact. The status of Alsace-Lorraine was established by the treaty of Paris at the end of the Franco-Prussian war. On the one hand it is said that the treaty was signed under duress; on the other, that all treaties, after one party is vanquished, are made under duress, as, for example, the treaty following our own Revolution and that which ended our Mexican war. When a status is thus established it is not customary to go into past history. But in the Alsace-Lorraine issue, historical facts are invoked on both sides. France would go back a half century and undo a wrong; Germany went back, at the treaty of Paris, two centuries, claiming to undo another. Both sides would take us into history, most of it unfamiliar to the majority of people, either from observation or study. Therefore to history let us go, and start from the beginning; for the struggle for the Rhine valley is old and seems endless.

And first as to Alsace, the flat and fertile Rhine-plain east of the Vosges mountains and extending from a point about opposite Basle in Switzerland northerly beyond Strasburg, which, with Mulhausen and Colmar, make its chief cities. We first know it as possessed by the Celt of whom there now remain the Welsh and the Irish. For all that we know their possession was hostile to some former race or tribes. Immigration into Europe from the Asian plains was by waves racially distinct from each other, a people generally spoken of as Iberians and perhaps represented in the Black Celts of Ireland and the people of the Basque province, probably first; then the Celts, then the Teutons and after them the Slavs and Huns, each pushing the other forward and each wave often mingling its population with the one preceding. Many years intervened between the waves. How did the Celts lose Alsace? It was after the Teutons, to whom the name of Germani came to be applied by the Romans, had settled on the east bank of the Rhine.

The Teutons seemed bent on moving west, pushed from behind by the Slavs. The Anglo-Saxon tribes crossed the narrow sea and drove back the Welsh from the good soil of England. Into Alsace the Germans came by invitation. Two Celtic tribes quarrelled and one of them asked Ariovistus, him of Cæsar's Commentaries, to cross the Rhine and help. He came in full force and staid. Cæsar describes him as savage, proud, cruel, exacting children as hostages, and using tortures. To us he might appear as a composite of Von Ludendorf, Von Hindenburg, Von Bissing, Von Dithfurth, Von Bomb, Von Teufel and all the other generals of the German army. The Rhine valley, especially the west part as well as all Gaul, by Cæsar's victorious arms, now became a part of the Roman empire and what is now France so absorbed the Roman civilization, language and manners as to become permanently a Latin country. The Teutons of the Rhine plain, however, retained their racial characteristics, among which was a high spirit of individual freedom noted by Tacitus, but now apparently lost in the grinding machinery of autocracy. Although the Romans acquired and retained a dominance on the Rhine, they seem to have acquiesced in settlements of the Teutonic tribes on both sides of the river and to take these under a sort of protection. Their camps grew into cities and all went well so long as the empire itself remained strong. As it gradually weakened, other tribes of Germans, perhaps pressed from behind, showed a disposition to cross the river. The Alamanni, themselves Teutonic, early in the fifth century crossed into Alsatia, which they conquered and settled. Although their sway was brief they so impressed themselves on the old Teutonic element of Ariovistus that the Alamannic dialect of German can still be traced in southern Alsatia.

The year 476 marks the fall of the Roman empire except as far as it survived at Constantinople; and this marks the close of ancient and the beginning of mediæval history. The struggle for the Rhine valley, which we have seen going on in Cæsar's day, had now lasted five hundred years.

The fall of the empire saw the numerous German tribes concentrated into several loosely held confederations of which the only one of importance here is the confederation of the Franks. The Franks were settled on the lower Rhine as far as the Netherlands and the North Sea. In this way do they describe their own character in the introduction to the Salic law, formulated by the leading tribe, the Salian Franks. "The high famed nation of the Franks, who have God for their judge, are brave in war, profound in council, firm in union, manly in form, bold, prompt, firm; such is the nation, which, small in number, by strength and courage, broke the yoke of the Romans." They not only broke the yoke, but even before the fall of the empire they warred and plundered through Roman Gaul and even conquered Tarragona, in Spain. Nevertheless, both Roman and Frank, Latin and Teuton, had united their forces in 451, to

meet the invading hosts of Attila, the Hun, the self styled "scourge of God." On the plain of the Marne, by the defeat of Attila, it was settled that Germany and France, Spain, and, it may be Great Britain, should not become Mongolian, but that Latin and Teuton should divide the land, the Celts having already been crowded into mountainous corners. The common danger having passed and Roman legions once more and forever withdrawn from Gaul, new forces of immigration and conquest were released. We have seen Alsatia become Teutonic in place of Celt and so it is wholly to remain, both in its political connections and racial character, until almost our own time. For a thousand years there will be occasional political changes and affiliations, but they will be inter-Germanic. We will therefore pass to Lorraine.

Lorraine, as a province of France before the war of 1870, may be roughly defined as consisting of the valleys of the Moselle and Meuse, so far as the same lie south of Luxembourg and Belgium. It included the strong fortresses of Metz and Verdun and the cities of Nancy, Toul and St. Mihiel. Between it and the Rhine lay the French province of Alsace. In a general way these were the limits of Lorraine, as known in mediæval history. Taking up the history at the earliest point, it was probably about the sixth century that those Celts called Belgæ by Cæsar but not distinguished by him as Celts, migrated from central Europe and settled themselves in this region. Cæsar's conquests made them a part of the Roman province of Gaul. Here they would have gradually absorbed Roman civilization, and doubtless did so, in a degree, but a new enemy appeared. The Franks were moving west and in the third century were repulsed once and again by the Roman legions. In 357, the year following the great battle of Strasburg, in which Julian, afterwards emperor, defeated the Alamanni, who had destroyed the fortifications of the Rhine, he subdued the Salian Franks. These were settled in Toxandria, the country between the Meuse and the Scheldt, but were breaking further into Gaul.

In Toxandria he allowed them to remain, becoming tributary and furnishing soldiers to the Roman army. They were fairly well kept under until the fall of the empire after which they poured themselves over Gaul, by force uniting with themselves the Alamanni, and Riparian Franks who dwelt in the valleys of the Rhine and Moselle. Their great champion was Clovis and at his death or soon after, the kingdom of the Franks stretched over Gaul from Cologne to the present border of Spain. These were the fruits of conquest; what of the conquerors? "Although they were strongly attracted by the allurements of rapine," says Gibbon, "they professed a distinguished love of war which they considered as the supreme honor and felicity of human nature." Writing of Clovis and his line of Frank-German kings, Kohlrausch, the German historian, says that they were marked by vice, tyranny, cruelty and savage revenge and that the Franks of their day could not pos-



sibly be raised from their state of moral rudeness and degradation.

These were the "Dark Ages" so called; but now there broke a great light upon the world in the person of Charlemagne, or Karl the Great. Great in body, great in mind and great in soul, according to the measure of the age, the object of his life was to unite the Christian Germanic nations into one empire and even further to extend the benefits and peaceful influence of the Christian faith. In this he succeeded; but it was only by constant vigilance in repressing the predatory Saxons, the plundering Mongolians in Hungary, the quarrelsome elements in Italy. He promoted scholarship, fostered the churches, ruled with justice and, like Alfred the Great, studied the manuscripts and collated the texts of the Bible. At his death he ruled Central Europe from Spain to Hungary and also Italy.

"As the reorganizer of Europe," says one of his English biographers, "Charles claims a place among the world-heroes; in him are incarnated that spirit of order and that solicitude for the general welfare by which true statesmen may invariably be known." When Charles folded his hands upon his breast and murmured in broken accents, "Lord, into thy hands I commit my spirit," he left the world in the clear consciousness that he had done for it all that lay in his great power to do. He had even made provision for the conduct of its affairs after his death. Having three sons he knew that there would be strife and disorder if it were left to one to reign. The three together had not his own ability. He therefore made a division of the empire among them before his death, retaining the actual power while he lived. It is the manner in which he made the division and the reasons for it in which we are interested. We must admit that for such a man, who charged his sons to love the people as if they were their children and, after his defensive wars were over, gloried in the title of "The Pacific," purely dynastic, capricious or arbitrary reasons could not have been controlling. To one son was given Italy, to another that part of Gaul, with its capital at Paris, which the German element had not assimilated, nor was likely to assimilate with the old population. Louis, the eldest, received the real Frankland, land settled by Franks and in which they probably seemed to Charles to have their natural home. A part of this was on the east bank of the Rhine, Franconia, the old home of the Franks; part consisted of the valleys of the Rhine, Moselle and the Meuse, in which Roman civilization and the Latin language had to a certain extent disappeared. Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) was the capitol and within these limits were Alsace and Lorraine. This division of the empire is entitled to great respect as that of one whose ability as a warrior was excelled by his genius as an organizer. The division was defeated by the death of two sons before that of the emperor and the descent of the whole fell upon Louis the Pious. Louis was no sooner dead than his sons, Lothaire, Louis and Charles, disputed

the realm between them. A terrible battle resulted in the treaty of Verdun, which is reckoned one of the important events in history. By it Germany pure and simple, unmixed with other blood, and lying east of the Rhine, except Mayence, Spire and Worms, went to Louis; France, pure and simple, that is to say, Romanized Gaul, went to Charles the Bald, ruler of Burgundy, and between these the territory settled by the Salian and Ripuarian Franks, was given to Lothaire, with other land that made his kingdom stretch from Italy to the North Sea. Part of this kingdom became known as Lotharingia (Lorraine), and included, besides Holland and Friesland, also Alsace and Lorraine, as now known, the cities of Strasburg, Metz, Toul and Verdun, with the capital at Aix-la-Chapelle. The retirement of Lothaire into a convent precipitated a struggle between his nephews for his kingdom, which resulted in the treaty of Mersen, considered by some as more important than that of Verdun. At all events it seems to have met with general acquiescence. It drew pretty accurately the natural line between Latin and Teuton; and it made a cleavage between the two languages. For the present purpose it is enough to say that, conforming to the plans of Charlemagne and the treaty of 843, it gave Alsace, as ever, to Germany, as also the valleys of the Moselle and the Meuse.

But soon there came a radical change in the political order. Kings weakened and kingdoms decayed; nay, kingdoms ignominiously broke up into unorganized parts. The feudal system arises, in which the noble in his strong castle, with his retainers and serfs, can defy the central authority. Counties and dukedoms remain but the counts and dukes are independent of the original appointing power. If they became too oppressive of their neighbors, the guilds in the towns, combined, fought and obtained freedom. Thus did Strasburg, and acknowledged allegiance to the waning authority of the emperor, whoever he might be, chosen by the seven electors of Germany. The kings of France were defied by the nobles; Germany dissolved into several hundred fragments—duchies, countships, free cities, ecclesiastical principalities,—and the kingdom of Lotharingia went to pieces. For centuries thereafter we read of dukes of Lorraine, independent and acting with this political unit or that as interest for the time dictated. Little more than this can be said, especially of Alsace and Lorraine, until we reach the fifteenth century, and then there appeared an illustrious character who brought both these provinces, as well as the free imperial cities contained within their boundaries, into great prominence. This character was Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy and Count of Flanders. Burgundy corresponds roughly to southeastern France and its dukes, getting a foothold by a certain matrimonial alliance, had gradually acquired an ascendancy in Flanders, clinched after the rebellion of Liege and Dinant against their power, by the terrible retribution inflicted on those municipalities by Charles. Flanders and Burgundy together, in his view, would make a powerful kingdom, a buffer state

between France and Germany, if they could but be tied together by the acquisition of Lorraine. To this purpose he put himself, and had he succeeded there would have been a sort of new Lotharingia. In aid of this object he prosecuted designs also in Alsace. Great was the opposition, for both the provinces and the imperial cities had come to enjoy the freedom which they had under the feudal system. Nancy, Metz, Strasburg, Mulhausen, Colmar, were not to be had for the asking; and if they were, there was another, as resourceful, if not in arms, at least in plot and cunning, who had his eye on them. This was Louis XI of France, to whom it had been suggested when dauphin, that the natural boundary of France was the Rhine. So the valley of the Rhine and its tributaries again take their place in the course of history as "the tilting ground of nations."

Charles had no luck in Alsace, which was German to the core, and, although he held possession for a time under a mortgage, preferred alliances with the house of Austria or the Swiss Republic, Basel and Strasburg acting together in these matters. However, Lorraine was conquered, but held only for a time, after which it went to its own Duke, Renè of Provence. The duchy preferred Renè; the cities, their freedom under the empire. Yet there were elements that made the duchy gravitate towards France rather than the empire. Kirk, in his life of Charles, says that the people were mostly French and many of the nobility were of French extraction. Taking any plebiscite either before the Franco-Prussian war or after one cannot but notice the difference in nomenclature between Alsace and Lorraine. In Alsace,—Strasburg, Mulhausen, Colmar, Schlettstadt, Thann, Ensisheim, all ancient and Teutonic; in Lorraine,—Nancy, Epinal, Toul, Remiremont, Mirecourt, all Romance. Verdun and Metz are in contrast, the one a Romance modification of the Roman name, the other having a Teutonic form of the original Roman. When the line was drawn in 1871, it was between Metz and Verdun, and up to the present time a holocaust of human lives has not altered it. Yet Lorraine belonged to the kingdom of the Franks; Franks settled in it; it was reckoned an important part of the middle kingdom by Charlemagne; but in contrast with the countries lower down the valley of the Rhine and its affluents the absorbing form of civilization was Latin rather than Teutonic. Kirk describes Alsace at this period as almost entirely Teutonic, which may explain why Louis XI was so willing to give it over to the horrors of pillage and plunder after a pitiful attempt on the liberties of the Swiss.

From the death of Charles the Bold in 1477 we pass to the reign of Henry II of France and his war with the Emperor Charles V, begun in 1552. Great was the rivalry for power between the emperor and the king. The emperor, finding in Protestantism a danger to an autocratic throne, the Protestant princes of Germany sought the aid of Henry. He, having some reasons to think that Charles had

designs on three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, proceeded to seize them himself; also Pont-a-Mousson, and then turned a greedy eye on Strasburg. Strasburg was impossible, but in the peace that followed the war France kept Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The surrender of the last two cities and the incidents in the siege of the first, indicate that these cities gravitated toward France rather than toward the empire, in which Spain, hated and feared, was now the predominant partner.

When Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five propositions on the church door at Wittenberg in 1517, he precipitated a crisis, which, extending from the field of religion to that of political controversy started, in 1617, the Thirty Years War, which tore Germany from end to end and left a wreck from which recovery was slow. At first, great warriors were on the scene of battle,—Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Tilly. They died before the end and other men succeeded. One of these was Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, described by Schiller in one of those exquisite character sketches that illuminate his history of this war. Without the disinterested ideals of Gustavus, or any particular loyalty to Germany as a whole, he sought in the old spirit of feudalism for new power for himself on the Rhine and, expecting to make Breisach his capital, besieged and took that fortress town and had the provinces pretty well in his power. But he was playing into the hands of a man far greater than himself, whose master mind had been known for years in the diplomacy of Europe. Bernard suddenly died and, although he bequeathed Breisach and Alsace to his brother, together with his army, French money bought over the army and to France by the peace went most of the fruits of Bernard's conquests. Breisach, on the east bank of the Rhine, called "the key" to Germany, was, as said by a German writer, "conquered for the French by the valor of German troops" and this through the statecraft of Richelieu who, far from wishing for pacification, inasmuch as the war made France an indispensable ally and the hostile views of its public policy were promoted by seeing Germany cut to pieces by its own people as well as foreigners. (Kohlrausch, History of Germany).

The war ended at last, after thirty years of bloodshed and pillage, by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. By its terms the Netherlands were lost to the empire, for Spain was compelled to acknowledge their independence and the emperor to relinquish his right of fealty. Flanders, the Frankland of Charlemagne, was free, but not free from fear. From Germany, France, which had mixed in the war of religious dissension among the German states, and as a Catholic power forwarded the interests of the Protestant states merely for her own purposes, demanded enormous sacrifices. She had the upper hand and prevailed. Her right to Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which she had really enjoyed since 1552 was recognized. She was given the fortress of Breisach, upper and lower Alsace, the Sundgau, the right to garrison Philipsburg on the Rhine, and



the right of advocacy of the ten free imperial cities of Alsace,—not their possession or government. The natural feeling in Germany over this humiliating peace was thus expressed by a contemporary, quoted by Kohlrausch: “On the same soil where, in former times, our noble ancestors hurled defiance against the insolent Varus and his legions we are now doomed to behold foreigners without arms insult us and triumph over Germania. They summon us, and we humbly obey the call; they speak, and we listen with humility and attention as to an oracle; they promise, and we place faith in them as in God; they menace us, and we tremble like slaves. A sheet of paper filled up by a woman, whether at Paris or Stockholm, makes the whole Germanic empire tremble or rejoice. They already, in the very heart of Germany, discuss and dispute together over Germany, as to what they shall take from, and what they shall condescend to leave us; what feathers they shall pluck from the Roman eagle and therewith decorate the Gallic cock. And we ourselves, divided continually among each other, abandon our tutelary divinity for the idols of foreign nations,—to whom we sacrifice life, liberty, and honor.”

Thus far we have seen remarkable men influencing the disposition and destiny of Alsace-Lorraine, in the seemingly endless struggle between the Latin and the Teuton over this fertile and lovely region,—Julius Cæsar, the Emperor Julian, sometimes called the Apostate, Charlemagne, Charles the Bold, Louis XI, Charles V, and Richelieu. Before reaching the events making history in this present war, three remarkable men are to follow, of whom the first is Louis XIV, sometimes denominated *Le Grand Monarque*. His proper soubriquet is *Le Grand Voleur*, for, besides robbing his neighbors of their territories he robbed Europe of peace, his exchequer of resources, French industry, by revoking the Edict of Nantes, of a precious element, the French people of prosperity and, so far as a conscienceless king and corrupt court could do it, France of her virtue. In two scathing chapters and with ill concealed contempt, the public character of Louis has been held up to scorn by the publicist, Guizot, whose ability as a historian was only equalled by his high moral standards as a man. Enlargement of the territory of France by war, just or unjust, was the ruling foreign policy of Louis. On any slight pretence hostilities followed wherever self-interest led the way. His own words in his memoirs disclose “the nature of the beast.” “The revolutions I had in my mind seemed to me very worthy of execution; my natural activity, the ardor of my age, and the violent desire I felt to augment my reputation, made me very impatient to be up and doing; but I found at this time that the love of glory has the same niceties as the most tender passions. I was in full enjoyment of my good fortune and the fruits of my good conduct, which had caused me to profit by all the occasions I had met with for enlarging the boundaries of my kingdom at the expense of my enemies.” He coveted Flanders but the free republic of Holland stood

in the way; therefore war with Holland, defended by William of Orange, backed by England.

Incidentally, in 1675, he entered Lorraine. The whole duchy was reduced and the duke made a fugitive. "In 1681," says the editor of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "during a time of peace, he suddenly seized Strasburg and this unjustifiable action received formal recognition at the peace of Ryswick in 1697." Thus did he lay a fuse, that, slowly burning, has for the second time blazed up in war, in 1914. Speaking somewhat in hyperbole, Ruskin said at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War that Louis Napoleon had no more to do with its causes than a cork on the top of a wave with the toss of the sea. As in the western migration of the nations already described, the propelling force is far behind, the one in place, the other in time. Cressey, in his "Decisive Battles of the World," says that Louis "stole" Strasburg and, describing the events leading up to the battle of Blenheim, which redeemed Europe from what Guizot calls "the yoke of Louis XIV," uses this language:—"Though the court of England submitted to abet the usurpations of France, and the king of England stooped to be her pensioner, the crime was not national. On the contrary, the nation cried out loudly against it, even while it was committing." Guizot does not claim as much for his own country, but writes: "Louis XIV had led France on to the brink of a precipice and he had in turn been led by her; king and people had given themselves up unreservedly to the passion for glory and the intoxication of success." "I loved war too much" was the death-bed confession of Louis XIV. It was in the final settlement after Louis' war of the Spanish succession which gave Strasburg to the French crown, that the conquest of Gibraltar by England was ratified and confirmed. This was of course humiliating to Spain, which made many efforts to reconquer it. It sustained in 1782 a continuous siege during which the rocky galleries devised by the English prefigured the trenches of recent warfare and their newly invented device of redhot shot suggests the gas and liquid fire of the present contest. Whether Gibraltar, a fortress held seemingly against the course of nature by one power within the territory of another, will prove such an everlasting source of international embarrassment in war as Alsace-Lorraine has been, remains to be seen. A great deal depends on the good sense, patience, and existing temper of the power that holds it and which has for a century been the power that held the hegemony of Europe.

We have seen Alsace and the free city of Strasburg lost to their semi-independence and to the German empire. It was in the following reign, of Louis XV, that the destiny of Lorraine was settled for a century and more. It came about in this way, Stanislaus, an able man and popular sovereign, had been king of Poland. The downfall of his protector, Charles XII of Sweden and the ensuing dominance of Russia in the affairs of Poland, had made him an exile. Meanwhile, a certain count and a certain madame, attached

to the French court, had brought about a marriage between the young king, Louis XV, and the daughter of Poland's late king. The reigning king of Poland, placed by Russia and Austria, now died and Louis naturally espoused the reinstatement of his father-in-law. The latter had no great desire to return, but the loud call from the Polish people seemed to make it his duty. Russia and Austria resisted and France was soon in the fray. The result was the treaty of Vienna in 1738 in which, as Guizot writes, "Duke Francis of Lorraine ceded the duchies of Lorraine and Bar (in which last is the city of Bar-le-Duc) to king Stanislaus, and the latter formally renounced the throne of Poland. After his death, Lorraine and the Barrois were to be united to the crown of France, as dower and heritage of that queen who had been but lately raised to the throne by a base intrigue and who thus secured to her new country a province so often taken and retaken, an object of so many treaties and negotiations, and tenderly cherished by France." Thus another fuse was laid to blaze up in 1870 and 1914.

From the time of Louis XV to that of Napoleon history has almost nothing to say of Alsace and Lorraine and even in Napoleon's day, very little. France was strengthening herself in the provinces which disunited Germany was too weak to reclaim. It has been asserted that Louis XIV proceeded to "Frenchify" the provinces and, even if he made no direct efforts to this end, it would naturally follow that French capital and people would flow in, just as the German element reinforced those regions after 1870. Seeley, in his life of Stein, referring to the era of Napoleon, says that "those populations had been French so long that no one thought of them any longer as subject to a foreign tyranny." One of Stein's own letters speaks of the rural Lorrainers as breaking out in insurrection against his administration during his temporary government of territory occupied by the allies in the wars with Napoleon and in a letter to Lord Castlereagh he couples Alsace and Lorraine as rather favoring Napoleon than the allies. This feeling, as regards Alsace, probably had its origin in the fact that in 1617 the Austrian archdukes made over their rights in this duchy to the Spanish branch of their house and the Spanish régime was more hated than the French. The German empire, in its weakness, was helpless to defend and this threw them into the arms of France as the only protection from the stronger powers. Another reason is found in the religious dissensions. Before the robberies of Louis XIV the Reformation had practically secured the whole of Alsace. The result of Bourbon domination is thus described by an English writer in the *Contemporary Review* for July 1894:—"Economically, Alsace had good reason to be grateful to the French régime: the cultivation of the vine and of tobacco was carefully fostered by the French government. But, without violent persecution, a steady relentless war was made against the Protestant faith, and, by the time the Revolution came the bulk of the population had been won back to Catholicism. No one

rejoiced more in the era of civil and religious liberty that seemed to be dawning in 1789 than did the Protestant inhabitants of Strasburg; but the noblest and best of them perished on the guillotine in 1794." The varied change in the character and preferences of the population is illustrated in the case of Mulhausen, at a somewhat later time. Mulhausen at the time of the Franco-Prussian war was more bitter against the Germans than any spot in Alsace, but when it yielded its independence and came into the kingdom of France in 1798 many families left it rather than change their nationality. The writer last quoted, referring to the effect of the French revolution, says:—"As a matter of fact, Strasburg and, to a great extent, Alsace, remained essentially German in language, culture, and sentiment, until the principles of 1789 and the victories of the empire awoke a strong French patriotic sentiment. Kleber, Kellermann, and Rapp were Alsatians, and Marshall Ney was the son of a miner at Saarbrucken. It was a terrible blow to the young heroes of the war of liberation when the determined opposition of Russia prevented Alsace and Lorraine from being re-incorporated with Germany."

The expatriation of a people, whether forced or semi-voluntary, such as happened on the Rhine after the conquests of Louis and again, in the 70's after those of William I of Germany, naturally excites pity, even after years are gone, and the events appear only as we unroll the scroll of history. Upon such an occurrence Longfellow built the story of *Evangeline* and our feeling of sympathy and helpfulness for the American Indian may result in part from the forcible transfer of the civilized Cherokees from their old homes in Georgia to the wild plains of the territory,—the republic atoning for its past. Sometimes such an expatriation has been big with unforeseen results. An early example is the removal of the Jews by their conquerors to Babylon, by which the whole race, so far as it returned to Palestine, was saved from absorption with its captors, was purged of dross and became a religious stock, unsurpassed before or since;—the stem from which Christianity has sprouted. A later example is that of the Puritan settlers, ostracized, persecuted, and then self-exiled in the bleak climate of New England, becoming "God's young plantation in the virgin West." The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a godsend to the industrial progress of England and the evil of autocracy dominating Germany in 1848, as it does today, gave to the United States a virile element in its population, an element which shone forth in Schurz, Siegel, Lieber, and Follen, and does at this day in Bamberger, Kahn, Scherer, Schwab, and others.

Napoleon now arises on the wave of the Revolution only to sink again in the mire of self-seeking. He organized the Rhenish confederation but it had no particular effect on Alsace-Lorraine. He menaced England, conquered Spain, controlled Italy, and wiped his feet on Prussia and the other German states that did not ally



themselves with him. He by fear and Stein by foresight are largely the creators of Prussian strength and pride. He turned the Revolution to his private purposes and an American standing by his magnificent tomb might wonder where is America's mausoleum to Aaron Burr. Napoleon stood in reverence at the tomb of Frederick the Great. Americans also stand there; but for any reverence they might feel there is in order of a sense of gratitude that their own country has not produced the like. The Napoleonic cult of power has been a mischief to France and today inspires the military party of Germany. The difference between France and England is somewhat the difference between the "Glory" that stirred Louis XIV and occurs so often in Napoleon's addresses to his troops and the "England expects that every man will do his duty" that spelt victory at Trafalgar. Louis IX and Henry of Navarre seem forgotten and the two royal robbers remembered. The relieving tint is the aureole that still lingers around the head of the Maid of Lorraine. One of her memorials is destroyed, perhaps through the negligence of the French in allowing its town to become of military importance; at all events by the bad marksmanship (or worse) of the Germans. The destruction at Rheims and the brutal indifference to the world's great treasures kept for the posterity of all the nations alike, German as well as French, shown by the language of General Von Dithfurth, would seem to indicate that in utter indifference to posterity the German generals would even sterilize the young of Germany if they could thereby score even temporary success in arms.

The treaties which concluded the Napoleonic wars left the countries territorially about as they were before. The contracting parties, so far as their sovereigns were concerned, had been trembling for their thrones, and dynasties of course had to be preserved, even if peoples were forgotten. The struggle over present injuries had been too long and too severe to allow of any attempt to right old wrongs, if any there were. France retired to her former boundaries, keeping and presumably Latinizing Alsace-Lorraine; England continued in her old and present policy of picking up plums wherever any were to be had on the surface of the globe, always with a keen eye on the Mediterranean as the highway to the east. Gibraltar, of course, which to a Spaniard seems a precious vital from Spain "untimely ripped," was the gem of England's possessions in defense of her Mediterranean trade route, and having been British for a century no question seems to have been seriously raised as to the continuance of the same sovereignty. "It was taken," says Captain Anderson in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "by the allied British and Dutch forces on the 24th of July, 1704. The capture was made, as the war was being fought, in the interests of Charles, archduke of Austria, but George Rooke, the British admiral, on his own responsibility, caused the British flag to be hoisted, and took possession in the name of Queen Anne, whose government ratified the occupation. A great number of the inhabitants of the town of Gibraltar

abandoned their homes rather than recognize the authority of the invaders." In the wars with Napoleon, the plum that fell to Great Britain was Malta. The treaty of Amiens (1802) had stipulated for the return of this island, captured by the British, to a neutral power. Napoleon fulfilled his part of the treaty, but backed by the Maltese, who disliked French influence, "England," in the words of the Encyclopedia just quoted, "actually renewed war with France, sooner than give up Malta," and the occupation was confirmed in the second treaty of Paris (1814). Fox protested that to break a solemn engagement, to retain Malta, would be an unworthy breach of faith which would compromise the honor of Britain." When in 1878, as the result of Russia's war with Turkey, which came near driving the Turks out of Europe, the diplomacy of Beaconsfield in preventing it was rewarded with Cyprus without the unsheathing of a sword, for it rained larks in Britain then. The Boer War, however, after The Jameson raid, cost some blood. Alongside it all is the two power fleet and the increasing jealousy of nations. But this much may be said for Britain, if she rules the seas and the shores they bound, her rule is more benign than would be that of any nation except this, to which, after the declared and adhered-to policy regarding Cuba and the Philippines, no great power has, in its international standards, as yet attained. The natural feeling of many Americans towards England, so often voiced in the last few years, had already been expressed by one of our own poets:

#### TO ENGLAND; AT GIBRALTAR

Thou art the rock of empire, set mid-seas  
Between the East and West, that God has built;  
Advance thy Roman borders where thou wilt,  
While run thy armies true with his decrees;  
Law, justice, liberty—great gifts are these;  
Watch that they spread where English blood is spilt,  
Lest, mixed and sullied with his country's guilt,  
The soldier's life-stream flow, and Heaven displease.

Two swords there are: one naked, apt to smite,  
Thy blade of war; and, battle-storied, one  
Rejoices in the sheath, and hides from light.  
American I am; would wars were done.  
Now westward, look, my country bids goodnight—  
Peace to the world from ports without a gun.

WOODBERRY, 1890.

From the Congress of Vienna to the Franco-Prussian war is a period of fifty-five years. Had France been wisely governed during this period perhaps there might not have been a Franco-Prussian war. But amid the turmoils of a nation floundering about in the

troubles that naturally attend upon trying self-government after ages of oppression, she allowed herself to be led in a wild dance for glory by an adventurer, the nephew of Napoleon. Meanwhile Prussia had come under the leadership of Bismarck. Bismarck saw, or thought he saw, the necessity for three wars. These he brought to pass in his own way and time. The Schleswig-Holstein War, which turned on the conflicting claims of Denmark and Germany to the succession of a duchy, does not concern us; but its fruits were the harbor of Kiel and the Kiel Canal. The Congress of Vienna had left the German states, now reduced from 300 to 38, in a loose confederation in which Austria was the "predominant partner," and so effectually and offensively predominant, as felt by Bismarck, that she must, in the interest of Prussia, be shaken out of the confederation. The victory of Sadowa ended a seven weeks war in which Austria was defeated, her allies among the German states crushed, and Prussia received large accessions of territory, particularly in the region of the Rhine, deducted by Prussia from the territory of Austria's allies. The last war in which Bismarck engaged and the last that he advocated, was that waged with France in 1870. The issues of this war have so direct a bearing on one of the much mentioned phases of the present contest that a careful study of its origin is worth while.

Of course, like most great events, its roots were historical. Said Ranke to Thiers at Versailles,—one historian to another,—“Germany is fighting Louis XIV.” Ruskin's contemporary comment has already been quoted. As to the immediate causes, aside from Prussia's willingness to expand at the expense of her neighbors, even German neighbors, and the devotion of France to something called “glory” as distinct from sober government, two views may be presented, one French and the other American. The first is to be found in a small book in the French language used in this country as a textbook, “*Recit et Contes de la Guerre de 1870*,” edited by Mary Stone Bruce (Henry Holt & Co.). The quotation is taken from an abridgment of “The War of 1870-71” by General Niox, Governor of the Invalides, who reviewed the manuscript of the abridgment. A translation of a certain paragraph would read as follows: “In 1860 war broke out between these two powers (Prussia and Austria). Most of the states of Germany sided with Austria. Italy was the ally of Prussia. The great victory of Sadowa resulted in a peace; Prussia, victorious, imposed her will on the rest of Germany. The French emperor, Napoleon III, took no part in this war. Bismarck had been assured of his neutrality in leaving him falsely to hope that for compensation for the aggrandisement that Prussia would obtain, France could acquire some country on the left bank of the Rhine. After Sadowa, Bismarck changed his tune and the relations between France and Prussia became strained. It was foreseen that, soon or late, war would break out between them. France awaited an occasion and Prussia found it. Ever since 1866 war was

inevitable between France and Prussia. France could not see without displeasure the development of the Prussian power. To this discontent was united, in bringing on the war, the conviction of her military superiority." After stating that Bismarck wished a war in order to unite the German states in a common enterprise; that Prussia had a good king ("*un bon roi*"), a great general, a minister of genius and a large and well-disciplined army, while France, entirely unprepared for war, was governed by "a sick man and a visionary," the narrative continues: "In 1870 the crown of Spain had been offered to a prince of Hohenzollern related to the royal family of Prussia. The government of Napoleon was alarmed at this candidature and demanded its withdrawal. The prince consented to retire, and the king of Prussia approved; but the Duke de Gramont, Napoleon's minister of foreign affairs, desired to exact a guaranty for the future. The Prussian king refused to guaranty the future." Showing how Bismarck needlessly, except for his purpose of forcing the issue, put together two telegrams from the king in such a way as to stir up France, the author concludes: "When the German despatch" (from Ems, where the king was, to Berlin) "was communicated" (in the form given to the press by Bismarck) "to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, there was an explosion of wrath. Thiers, great statesman that he was, spoke in vain in favor of peace. War was declared by France July 17, 1870." Bismarck's comment on his own device was, "This will be a red rag to the Gallic bull."

The military successes of Napoleon III in Italy and certain other things more showy than solid had made him popular at home, and in 1869 France had indorsed him and the continuance of his dynasty by an overwhelming vote. In his enfeebled condition he may have been less eager for war than the representatives of the people. He was then at the summit of his fame but, as the Prussian chancellor well knew, had passed the zenith of his real power. In fact, Bismarck never saw in him anything more than "a great, unrecognized Incapacity." An interesting view of the situation is given by one well qualified to judge by his own connection with foreign affairs in continental Europe, Andrew D. White, formerly president of Cornell University and American ambassador to Germany in the years 1879-1881. The following extracts are from his "Seven Great Statesmen," and the connecting narrative may be inferred. "The question now was—will this supreme potentate, Napoleon III, allow a united Germany on the borders of France and, if so, at what price? He had permitted various states of Italy to unite; indeed, he had sent his armies to aid them, but he exacted in return the cession of Nice and Savoy from Cavour. What cession of territory would he now demand from Bismarck? This question, and others grouped around it, Bismarck had studied for ten years, taking pains at various times to meet the French emperor and to discuss burning questions with him. Gradually Bismarck's frank-



ness invited something like similar on the emperor's part; his dreams for the future were now largely revealed, and all these might be summed up in one statement,—“France must extend her boundaries to the Rhine.” Bismarck saw that the (Seven Weeks) war had strengthened Prussian territory by such vast additions from the northern and middle states that Austria could never again claim supremacy in Germany; but he also saw looming up in the immediate future something which his opponents did not see,—a great war with France. He foresaw that France, duped, enraged, all her calculation brought to naught, would never, without a savage struggle, permit the establishment on her boundaries of a united Germany.”

“Napoleon III was not allowed by the French nation to forget the glories of the First Empire. If the sway of France could not be extended throughout the valley of the Rhine, it might at least prevail over portions of southern Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.” “Despite the fact that the French government, the Chambers, the people, had been amply informed from the most trustworthy sources that their army was utterly unprepared, they insisted on demands which could only lead immediately to war. Driven on by this tempest, the Duke de Gramont telegraphed additional orders to Benedetti. He must secure from King William not only the young prince's renunciation but a declaration that no Hohenzollern would ever again, under any circumstances, become a candidate for the Spanish throne. Every day from the 6th to the 13th of July Gramont was plying him with telegraphic orders to press the king harder and get more distinct assurances, in fact, to get evidences for the Paris mob that the king had been humiliated.” “Prussia, and indeed all Germany, showed a determination more sober but quite as sincere. On July 19th the French declaration of war was received at Berlin.” “Bismarck shrewdly guided opinion at home towards war and in the interest of neutrality.” He ere long revealed to Europe, through the *London Times* and other agencies the previous French proposals, to annex to France, in time of peace, territories belonging to Belgium, the Netherlands and Southern Germany, and some of these proposals on French official paper and in the handwriting of Benedetti” (French ambassador at the Prussian Court) “he circulated widely in fac-simile.” “In September Strasburg capitulated and Bismarck saw realized his great dream of recovering Alsace and its historic capital. In all these Bismarck circulars there was an undertone of defiance which all foreign powers thought it best to heed. Bismarck's argument as regards the taking of Strasburg and Metz was that, “as there had been twenty-three unprovoked invasions of Germany from France, in days gone by, Germany was henceforth determined to keep the key of her two western doors in her own hands.” To these views may be added extracts from the article on France in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, as follows:—

After Sadowa, "France realized with an angry surprise that on her eastern frontier had arisen a military power, by which her influence, if not her existence, was threatened; that in the name of the principle of nationality unwilling populations had been brought under the sway of a dynasty by tradition militant and aggressive, by tradition the enemy of France; that this new and threatening power had destroyed French influence in Italy, which owed the acquisition of Venetia to a Prussian alliance and Prussian arms; and that all this had been due to Napoleon" outwitted by Bismarck. "Napoleon Third's foreign policy was as contradictory as his policy in home affairs; 'The empire is peace' was his cry and he proceeded to make war." In 1870 "the empress Eugenie was credited with the remark, 'If there is no war, my son will never be emperor.'" The prince was killed in the Zulu war; the empress lives, an exile in England. The treaty of Frankfurt, concluding the Franco-Prussian war, not only restored to Germany Alsace and a large part of Lorraine, including Strasburg and Metz, but exacted an indemnity of five thousand millions, which latter, transferred to Germany, started a tide of speculation, followed by a panic. The line then established between French and German Lorraine coincides in a general way with that established more than a thousand years before in the treaty of Verdun. It gave to Germany the powerful fortresses of Strasburg and Metz and left to France the powerful fortresses of Verdun and Belfort. While England and the United States were allowing their respective strongholds on the lakes to go to decay, these two countries of Europe have ever since been glaring at each other over their heavy guns. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the French nation as a whole has always considered the treaty of Frankfort, as Bolingbroke said of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, as "nothing more than a composition between the bully (Louis XIV) and the bullied," a treaty made in hopes to be broken.

We have at last arrived at the final period, if it can be called final, in the age-long struggle for the valley of the Rhine. Forty-three years elapsed from the treaty of Frankfort to the beginning of the present war. It will be useful to follow the course of events in Germany and France between these dates so far as they shed any light on the "lost" or the "restored" provinces, whichever one may see fit to call them. The administration of the provinces by Prussia, through the king of Prussia, began with the voluntary exile of some 50,000 inhabitants who preferred affiliation with France. The incident naturally recalls the departure of the Pilgrims from their loved homes in England and Holland, rather than the forcible expatriation of the French from Arcadia or the Cherokees from Georgia. Goldsmith has touched these strings of pity in "The Deserted Village," describing the effects of the wretched land system of Great Britain and Ireland:

Have we not seen at Pleasure's lordly call  
The smiling long frequented village fall?

Beheld the duteous son, the site decayed,  
The modest matron and the blushing maid,  
Forced from their homes, a melancholy train,  
To traverse climes beyond the Western main?

With such a number leaving the provinces of their own accord, it is safe to say that a much greater number would have been glad to leave or would be likely to stay in the provinces unreconciled to their new masters.

The last word suggests the great mistake, the criminal blunder, which Germany has made in dealing with the provinces. The policy of mastery has too often prevailed over that of benevolent assimilation. The chip-on-the-shoulder, click-the heels manner of the military party has overcome the wiser counsels of the civilians, among whom may be reckoned Prince Hohenlohe of Bavaria, an early governor of Alsace-Lorraine, whose letters and policy in this matter may be found in his "Memoirs." To begin with, Alsace-Lorraine, instead of entering into the German empire like the other states, was, as it were, outlawed and made Reichsland, or imperial territory, and after the lapse of years is as yet nothing more. There has been, however, an enlargement of powers in legislation, over which the emperor has a veto, and besides the "Landesausschuss," a constitutional body with parliamentary privileges the territory has two members in the Bundesrat and fifteen members in the Reichstag. To what extent have the inhabitants become reconciled to the union with Germany? Whoever cares to investigate this question may consult two candid articles, one by an Englishman in the *Contemporary Review* for July, 1894; the other by a Frenchman, Pierre de Coubertin, in the *Fortnightly*, reprinted in the *Living Age* of March 23, 1907. The English writer, who seems to have been a newspaper correspondent in the war of 1870, devoted six months twenty-three years later, to a study of conditions and reports many facts and some conclusions. He draws a distinction between the feeling in the country districts and some of the large towns. "During the war of 1870, speaking to a young Alsatian peasant and asking him how he felt with regard to a possible annexation to Germany, the reply was, 'To us peasants it matters nothing whether we are French or German; in either case the powers that be will take care that we pay taxes enough'" and of the feeling a generation later, the investigator says concerning Alsace: "Speaking generally, the peasant is not dissatisfied. He would like to pay fewer taxes and to escape military service; on the other hand, he recognizes that the present régime, if not gracious, is just and conscientious to a degree. It is also an administration of his own race and speech, and there is nothing very attractive in the prospect of being relegated to officials alien to him in race, who do not understand a word of his language, and who have always despised him for not understanding theirs. He sees that his material interests are being well looked after and that he is saving

money and adding at once to his possessions and comforts. All he desires is to be let severely alone, and the one thing he dreads is a war, which would practically end his well being, for which it would be no sort of compensation to find at its close that he had become, as his fathers were, a citizen of the French nation. In the great towns the feeling is somewhat different. In Strasburg, for instance, there is the Ligue Patriotique. The *raison d'être* of this secret society is to restore Alsace to France, and it is animated by an uncompromising hatred to German rule"—Brief interviews are narrated, as, for example, "‘I was born a Frenchman; I have served in the French army; I should like to live and die a Frenchman. Apart from this I cannot say I have much to complain of, the law is just and the administration of it is fair and equal.’" "There is a class among the younger men who say: ‘It is true I was born under the French government, but I am not a Frenchman now. I was always a German by descent, and race, and language and I feel myself to be a German, not only politically, but also in feeling and sentiment.’" As to Lorraine: "What has been stated about the peasantry in Alsace, applies also in equal measure to the peasantry of Lorraine. They are gradually being Germanized. This does not apply to the nobility, gentry, and well-to-do classes in and around Metz." "During my visit to Metz I was out on my tricycle every morning at 6 p. m. when I met the workmen coming to their work, and must have conversed with hundreds of them. All under thirty spoke German perfectly. The old men and women still only speak French while they constantly assured me with pride, "‘I have a son at home who speaks German well.’" "The habitual use of pure German is causing the Germanization of Lorraine to proceed more rapidly than that of Alsace." To these specific instances the writer adds, "I might multiply detail, but perhaps what has been given will sufficiently illustrate the views I have formed. The strong sentiment obtaining at this moment in Alsace-Lorraine seems to me closely analogous to the Jacobite sentiment which lingered in Scotland until the beginning of this nineteenth century. It was powerful as a sentiment long after it had ceased to be a motor in practical politics." In conclusion the writer condemns the "Reichsland policy." What is a Reichsland? A land attached by military power to the empire, but otherwise unattached. The very name proclaims it to be a conquered country. This is just what should be forgotten as soon as possible."

What has just been quoted will make more clear the following extract from the before mentioned article of Pierre de Coubertin, published seven years before the outbreak of the present war. "I think I may speak confidently of Alsace, because I know the country well and yet am not an Alsatian. It is said that Alsace has become detached from France, and that is true up to a certain point; people cannot remain for an indefinite length of time feeding upon their sorrows, especially in the case of such energetic and active people as



the Alsatians. They have accommodated themselves to the new situation, have recognized certain advantages in it, and have profited by them. They still continue to profess the greatest devotion to France; but I believe—and I say this flatly, for I am in the habit of expressing my opinions without troubling myself as to whether they are agreeable to one side or the other—I believe that if the proposal were made to Alsace today that she should sever herself from the German empire in order once more to become merely two French departments, it would be difficult to find a majority to sanction the step; although if, while attaching herself once more to the French republic, Alsace could still preserve her autonomy, the majority in favor of that course would be considerable.” For a recent article, sympathetically French, on the general subject the reader may consult the *Unpopular Review* for April, 1918.

Leaving Germany and the provinces, let us turn our eyes to France; in connection with which the salient facts during this period are the Franco-Russian alliance and the so-called *revanche*.

During the war England had remained neutral, not a little critical of France; Italy was no longer drawn to her and at the close of the war she found herself decidedly isolated. She naturally turned to Russia, and the republic and the autocracy in the early 90's contracted a morganatic marriage. Whether, in view of the recent Russian collapse and the immediate striking of Germany for France as Russia's ally at the outbreak of the present war, with all that this has entailed on Belgium and France, was a good thing to do, the historians of the future will discuss with more facts and less prejudice than we. Germany and France had been each suspicious of the other's intentions; Russia wanted French loans and France, besides secretly or openly hoping that by some turn of affairs Alsace-Lorraine might come back to her had never quite lost her love for *la danse de Gloire* to the music of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. Until the *entente cordiale* the relations between England and France had been strained because of the former's determination to control Egypt and her checking the moves of the latter in this direction. France now seems to have settled down to the inevitable in Egyptian affairs, albeit it has been said that even since Napoleon looked upon the pyramids France felt the land of the Pharaohs as some day to be her own. *Revanche* is the word generally used for that centering of hopes on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France which about every Frenchman seems to entertain. The form of the word, to one whose native language is English, suggests the idea of vengeance but the French is not so strong. The noun is defined as “*Action de rendre la pareille pour un mal qu'on a reçu*” and the verb as “*Rendre la pareille en mal on en bien.*” In English, particularly in international affairs, it may be defined as a “recovery,” “a return to the *status quo ante*,” “a putting of things back as they were before.” In this sense it was early used in France and figures in the present war; sometimes,

with the smart of wrongs, old or recent, not unnaturally connected with the idea of revenge. In the sense as defined, France has never lost sight of the *revanche*. There have, indeed, been forces operating in the other direction, notably the fellow-feeling of socialists like Juarez in all countries for each other. Surprising as it may seem, General Stoffel, a responsible actor in the war of 1870, himself an Alsatian, who felt that by its result France had lost what was to her more than mere territory, namely, her security, and been placed in a humiliating and intolerable position by the loss of fortresses, nevertheless advocated a friendly union of France and Germany, as an offset to the advance of Russia. "It is not necessary," says Stoffel, "to have meditated much on the state of Europe to perceive that the danger which threatens civilized nations is at the East, where it increases every day, slowly but surely. It can be affirmed that, thanks to the divisions which disintegrate nations, Russia will some day or other become mistress of the provinces of the Danube. When that day comes, she will encircle Europe from the Baltic to the Archipelago, protected on her two flanks by those two seas, in a position which nobody will be able to turn or attack from behind. Having there at her service the numerous sailors of the islands of the Archipelago, she will spread gradually, like a grease spot, and will soon obtain the coasts of the Adriatic and Trieste. When she has at her head a conquering Czar, how will the Occidental people, if they are still disunited, resist the formidable pressure of the Slavic race? It will be a war of civilization against barbarism, and the moment may then come when will be accomplished for Europe the prophecy of Napoleon at St. Helena, 'Republican or Cossack.'"

During the period succeeding the treaty of Frankfurt divers reprehensible things were done by divers European governments. Germany seized Kiaochou and kept it until dislodged in 1914. Italy jumped on Abyssinia, for reasons perhaps not explainable to her own conscience and was defeated by a brave adversary. Austria, taking advantage of a delicate situation in Europe, took to herself Bosnia and Herzegovina, over which she had a protectorate by the treaty of Berlin. It was not like larceny; it was worse,—embezzlement by a trusted fiduciary. Turkey slaughtered Armenians and Belgium allowed a wicked king to persist in killing and enslaving on his private estate in the Congo, until his people became ashamed in face of the world's protest. France, the new republic, forgetting that true democracy is Christianity on its political side, merely for conquest and gain, destroyed the independence of Madagascar, then well on the way to an ordered government, and advancing in civilization. Needless to say that France cannot come before the world with clean hands asking for Alsace-Lorraine until she has put Madagascar in the way of independence. Great Britain successfully fought the Boer republics and in the midst of war Victoria, of blessed memory, went in sorrow to her grave. Concerning this war which substituted for a republican an aristocratic-monarchical form and to

a certain extent nullified the suffrage, the opinions of the bulk of the liberal party were much like that of the rest of the world. It was expressed in these terms by a prominent Indian, educated in and having much affection for England: "In my opinion those who have read Sir Edward Clarke's speeches, Mr. Frederick Harrison's open letter to Lord Salisbury, Mr. John Morley's speeches, etc., cannot but come to the conclusion other than that this war is one of the most cruel, unjust and inhuman wars. It is difficult to believe that a country like England, the nursery of freedom and independence, should wage it against a people so weak and insignificant as the Boers. Say whatever Lord Salisbury and his associates may, it is clear that gold fields and diamonds are the cause. Is this the fruit of civilization?" One more example. The ancient empire of Persia, tottering towards decline, had a chance of renewal of strength and an able American lawyer undertook the rehabilitation of the finances. This would never do; other plans had already been considered and the Persian saw, or thought he saw, two beasts of prey approaching, one from the north and another from the south, eager to divide the political carcass of the historic empire, leaving just a little between for manners. The American was given leave to withdraw, for the Bear and the Lion, each fearsome of the other, had become partners in the enterprise.

The Cossack fear has counted for much in the mental state and attitude of certain peoples and explains something of what would otherwise be obscure. France has had it; Germany has had it; England has had it, as touching her eastern empire and highways thereto. Sir Alfred Lyall, in his life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, makes the bald statement: "Just as a fortress or a line of entrenchments requires an open space around or in front of it, so it is manifestly advantageous for the security of a kingdom to be surrounded by a ring of territories with which powerful neighbors must not meddle. Upon this principle we place the adjoining states under our protectorate, whether they desire it or do not; and thus our political influence radiates out beyond the line of our actual possession, spreading its skirts widely and loosely over the lands adjacent. From the time when the British dominion was first established in India, the prosecution of this policy has been one leading motive of wars, annexations, and alliances. The same policy had been practised by the Romans, and with similar results." Lord Dufferin himself did not share in the fear and wrote: "I am one of those who do not believe that Russia will actually invade India during the present (nineteenth) century, unless, indeed, she should produce a hero with the genius and ambition of Napoleon or Alexander and even then I think she would come to grief." † When viceroy of India he sub-

† It is with regret that the name of the first Marquis of Dufferin and Ava is here mentioned in connection with a policy that professes to contain no more of Christianity than that of ancient Rome; this for the personal reason that a chance acquaintance in a college hall (Lady Dufferin's Canadian Journal, page 206) led in the years following to various courtesies from one who was the embodiment of the highest courtesy and culture and became the peerage because he was one of nature's noblemen.

dued and annexed Burmah, believing this course to be better for both countries and it should be said that Burmah and Madagascar are not parallel cases.

The foregoing instances of international transgression are relevant as showing the temper of the peoples, the great difficulty as well as the still greater necessity of discovering some basis for peace that is radically new and which may be effective. This historic review may be concluded by an extract from an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* of February, 1918, from the pen of Daniel Blumenthal, at the opening of the present war the Mayor of Colmar in Alsace, which quotation may serve also as an introduction to the argument in summary for the possession of Alsace-Lorraine by France, to be followed by a like summary of the argument presented by Germany.

The inhabitants "were torn from their land, to be incorporated by force in a detested enemy state, whose autocratic government was the essential condition of prosperity in its militaristic policy. And even then they were not to enjoy the rights,—albeit closely restricted,—of German subjects. They were placed under an exceptional régime; instead of being German citizens, or, at least, German subjects, they became mere objects of domination. That is why Germany was destined to fail lamentably in all her efforts to amalgamate Alsace-Lorraine with Germany; the gulf between the native population became wider and wider; and we may say that the new generation was more bitterly opposed to the new masters than the generation of 1871 had been. Finally there came the Zabern affair, which covered Germany with ridicule. Every one knows that extraordinary story, which resulted in the replacement of the entire government of Alsace-Lorraine by Prussians utterly devoid of any spirit of fair dealing towards the oppressed people of the Reichsland."

The reasons following might be urged by a Frenchman for the reunion with Alsace-Lorraine, and others might perhaps be found.

1. The provinces were taken from France by force less than 50 years ago and France has never voluntarily acquiesced.

2. At the time of the taking they were essentially French; so far as the character of the population has changed it is the product of the original wrong. The numbers of unwelcome German officials may be compared to the carpet-baggers who overran the South after the civil war in the United States.

3. If it be admitted that lapse of time may or ought to bar recovery of territory unjustifiably appropriated, sufficient time has not yet elapsed to prevent a restoration to the original *status*.

4. The provinces have been misgoverned. Good government might condone the original wrong but the absurdity in this case is apparent. To be exact their return is no more than a fair mulct for the great German crime of today.

5. Conquered territory, unless rebellious, has a right to be united to the new sovereignty in the same manner as its other territory is



united. The provinces, should never have been, or least, at this late day, should not be Reichsland.

6. The defeat of France in 1870 was by Germany led by Prussia, not by Prussia, and the annexation to Prussia more removed in spirit from the spirit of the provinces than is Germany as a whole, is a wrong to be righted by the provinces returning to France.

7. If a fair vote were taken Alsace-Lorraine would be found desirous of returning to France.

8. Since the dastardly outrage on Belgium, when Germany played the sneak, she has forfeited in any conference of nations, the right to govern any territory, whose possession is a question of fair debate. To say the least, Germany is afflicted with moral insanity, and is more in need of a guardian than entitled to a wardship.

9. The Rhine is the natural eastern frontier of France. Without it she is insecure.

10. The treaty of Frankfurt was made under duress; not a treaty but a forced peace. It never had and can never acquire a binding force, except the unjust force of arms.

The reasons following might be given by a German for the retention of the provinces and others might perhaps be found.

1. Louis XIV wantonly robbed Germany of Alsace-Lorraine. He took advantage of a time when Germany was so weakened internally as to be incapable of resistance and he therefore played the bully. He represented France and France gladly accepted and enjoyed the stolen goods; at least she is a willing accessory after the fact.

2. The lapse of time did not destroy the right of recovery. No essential principle can be found to create in this way a difference between 50 years and 200 years. There is no statute of limitations in international law.

3. If in a conference of nations the case of Alsace-Lorraine should be reopened it would allow the reopening of similar cases occurring since 1870, in which territory has passed unwillingly to the predominant nation as the result of a war, whether the question is raised by the nation suffering the loss or by the transferred and would-be self-determinant population. The question can again be raised concerning Bosnia, Herzgovina, the subjected Boer republics, the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, and Cyprus.

4. The principle of *stare decisis* (the decision to stand) is embodied in the common law and the law of nations in the interest of peace; it does not assume that the previous decision was right, but not to recognize such a principle would be to admit of every decision being upset as soon as made and lead to perpetual litigation and trouble. In international law the result would be to perpetuate hatred and war, embarrass trade and discourage the arts of peace not only in and between the nations immediately affected but those connected with them by sympathy, commerce, race, or political alliance. Upon the principle of *stare decicis* (the last decision con-

trols), the sovereign power can alter the rule but cannot make it retroactive. There is no sovereign power as among and above the nations.

5. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was the natural result of the Franco-Prussian War. Although Germany desired this war it was because of the previous humiliations and open or covert threats of France as of a supposedly superior power and prestige. Not to settle the ability of Germany to cope with France, when united, was to allow of an irritating state of things, that would leave a disunited Germany at the mercy of France at some inopportune time when the designs of Napoleon III or his successors upon southern Germany and the lower Rhine would be likely to succeed. It is better to lance a sore than to allow it to fester. The acts of Napoleon III were purposely calculated to insult the king of Prussia and provoke a war. These acts were enthusiastically ratified by the French people in the Chamber of Deputies. Having willingly entered a war, and even been eager to bring it about, it is not manly but mean not to accept the consequences, especially when they concern territory that for ages belonged to the successful power which was robbed of it in an hour of weakness by its quarrelsome adversary. Sedan was but the natural and necessary consequence of Magenta, fought by France for purely selfish reasons and paid for by Italy in the annexation of Nice and Savoy.

6. An occupation obtained by aggression (of Louis XIV), although continued for two centuries, should not offset an occupation of more than a thousand years, confirmed by general consent both then and after the treaties of Verdun and Mersen, based on the wise statesmanship of Charlemagne who ruled in the interest and for the benefit of all Europe and united both the Latin and Teutonic countries in his domain to the satisfaction and happiness of all. The Teutonic occupation in the middle ages must be reckoned original because there is now no sovereignty in being to claim the benefit of an earlier occupation.

7. If regard be had to the population of the annexed territory, separately from the sovereignty to which they are lost, it may be said that those who cared more for the political affiliation with France than their native soil voluntarily removed themselves soon after 1870. If German settlers, other than the military, have come from across the Rhine, they have come innocently and have a right to be counted in the expression of the popular wish. To turn over a people from their German to a French sovereignty would not heal the sore but change the physician who was in charge of it. If Alsace-Lorraine wishes to unite with France it is pertinent to inquire whether Cyprus wishes to unite with Greece, the Egyptians to the Sultan, India return to her former state, Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, Madagascar to recover her independence, and the Dutch of South Africa to ally themselves with democracy either in the form of the original republics or sending representatives to sit in Westminster Hall.

8. The river Rhine is not the natural boundary between Germany and France. For no great length of time in two thousand years has it been the actual boundary. For reasons, obvious, especially when we consider events on the Rio Grande, the history of India and the annexation of Burmah, a mountain chain is the best possible barrier between two nations in rivalry or not in mutual confidence. The valley of the Rhine, like the valley of the Elbe, the Mississippi, the Loire, (and the writer would add, although no German just now would admit, the Adige,) should be treated so far as possible as a unit, in the interests of agriculture and trade, and sometimes of race and religion.

9. Notwithstanding French occupation, Alsace-Lorraine are in great part the creation of the Teutonic mind. In Alsace the language is to a great extent German inherited by the inhabitants as they were in 1870. The cathedral of Strasburg in the work of Erwin Von Steinbach and no German on the Rhine's east bank could without humiliation see it in other than German hands. Parts of Lorraine are of pristine Teutonic stamp and indicate a wish to acknowledge the original matrix.

10. In the Alsace-Lorraine question each side considers itself in the right and the question touches both very deeply in national honor and individual conscience. In such a case the burden of proof and the risk is on the party who would alter an existing situation.

11. It is true that the government of the Reichsland has not always been in accordance with the more conciliatory wishes of the civilian party, but it is to be remembered that the law is justly administered and that it takes time to win the confidence of an annexed people. England effected the conquest of Ireland centuries ago but her government of that country still blots the page of history. Her present allies do not expect her to change the sovereignty but to settle the question and have already given her more than two hundred years to do it. Till it is done the peace of the world will be disturbed. Meanwhile her cobelligerents are paying for it by a larger contribution of men in the present war than would otherwise be required.

The reasons set forth for Germany happen to be more than those set forth for France but one strong argument can outweigh many others.

Such are the historic facts, such the arguments, which have to do with the vexed question of Alsace-Lorraine. It is not intended here to propose a solution. After two millenniums of dispute and struggle it begins to look as if the problem were insoluble on any principles hitherto adopted in the adjustment of such affairs between nations. Superiority of power was Rome's way: but the rival may later obtain the superiority. The balance of power, a principle brought forward by William III of England, has served a purpose for Europe but would inevitably break down in the greater complication of the modern world, the whole of which must now be taken

into account. The fact that European nations have been almost exclusively controlled each by its own personal interests, is sufficiently plain upon the face of history. While it cannot be denied that the United States has a direct and imperative personal interest in the winning of this war, from the point of view of its rights on the seas, the fear of a military domination of the world and, particularly, its obligations to the republics south of us, based on the Monroe doctrine, yet we have certain benevolent and altruistic purposes which are hard to be realized by the self-centered governments of Europe. "One of the most difficult things I have attempted," says President Wilson in a letter to Dr. Jowett, "is to convince foreign ministers and foreign peoples that the purposes and ideals of the people of the United States are, indeed, unselfish and altruistic."

As to the present war, while it is undeniable that Germany started the blaze, yet an analysis of contributing causes brings out strongly the element of personal interest in other nations. The editors of the New International Encyclopedia (American) state the following forces as most directly contributory:

1. The clashing of national interests and ideals.
2. The maintenance of a system of military alliances.
3. The economic rivalry among the nations of Europe.

All this is self-centered to the last degree, "the failure of Christianity" in international law for the simple reason that it has not been tried, a state of things almost below the age of chivalry. As far removed as possible from this is a system, international in character, which takes account, not of might but of right, of power only as a means of enforcing the right; which recognizes the solidarity of nations as members of a brotherhood, the gradual enlightenment and correspondent increase of responsibility in the people of the separate states, and would transpose the motto *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*, to *Vox Dei, Vox Populi*, The voice of God should be the voice of the people. Friendship, as the president has said, and, it may be added, the mutual confidence upon which true friendship rests, is the normal ground of international relations. It is this state of feeling between Great Britain and the United States that has made the Great Lakes free from battleship and fortress for a century.

Through all the clouds unrimmed as yet by light can we anticipate the dawn of a better day? There is one significant fact. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Columbia of the North, under wise counsels and relegating mere power to its proper place, took the moral leadership of the world in the adjustment of international difficulties and has held it until now. The hard and foolish policy once pursued with the Indian tribes, isolated nations as they have always been considered, was reversed; the complications with China growing out of the boxer uprising were, thanks to this government, put upon a high moral plane in settlement and even the boxer fine repaid to the Chinese government. In fulfilling our obligation to our Southern neighbors, we crushed oppression in Cuba,



held the island a short time for its own sake and then returned it to the Cubans. By the hap of war the Philippines fell into our hands, but independence is promised and in wise and kindly fashion by education and the establishment of orderly government, the way is being prepared for it. The present administration has, to say the least, tried to be just and even gallant to Mexico and this perhaps at the expense of financial interests, which, of course, should not for a moment be allowed to stand in the way of a generous policy. The sympathy of this people for Belgium and their sense of its deep wrongs have furnished a moral background for our entrance into the war primarily in defense of our sacred rights. From the first the enlistment of Americans in British and French armies has suggested the youthful and pure consecration to liberty which animated our beloved Lafayette. It should be said that this advance of our foreign relations to a higher moral plane has been seconded by Britain in the considerateness shown in the Alabama claims and the attitude of Lord Salisbury's government in the Venezuela episode; also in the fisheries disputes. As matter of blood and money it would not be worth the while of the Americas, both north and south of the equator, to meddle with a question so local as Alsace-Lorraine, except as it may be intermingled with other matters having immediately to do with a peace settled upon a foundation radically new, and in establishing which all the powers of Europe might possibly be called to sacrifice territory in some part of the world in the interest of the self-determination of peoples.

Comparatively, Alsace-Lorraine is nothing; the kind of peace desired, in which militarism becomes a thing of the past, is everything. Notwithstanding the difficulties and the apparent remoteness of the end desired, this, of all times affords a great opportunity for making a serious effort to bring it to pass. Organizations already exist for this purpose. For such an end, with others, the church exists, and has existed from before the days of the truce of God. The danger is that at last the warring peoples will sink back exhausted, satisfied with the restfulness of peace, and too inert to engage in the constructive work necessary to secure the future. An increase of activity is necessary among all the forces for good in all countries, Asia not excepted. In the last analysis it is a question of righteousness and the law of love; of ideals prevailing among the people at large rather than the policy of their rulers for the time being. There is no force, said Napoleon, equal to the force of public opinion. The fountain cannot rise higher than its source in the sovereign people.

The path to a lasting peace lies through radical changes in the temper of men; through suffering; through sacrifice. It is only seen through the strained and clear vision of the eye that seeks the light. Lincoln was never braver than when he plainly told the American people, North and South, that slavery, connived at and supported by both, was the cause of the existing war, which might,

as he said in the second inaugural, continue "until every drop of blood drawn with the lash should be paid for with another drawn by the sword." Let us say then, for our era, that such sacrifices are at hand and already begun, and the sacrifices of blood and treasure are not all; that as nations rise higher in their standards of life, a peace based upon friendship, mutual confidence and the law of love becomes more attainable. In other words the standards must be raised. Let us say, for example, that, leaving the sufferings of war to do their work, the people of the United States must steel themselves against the wanton luxury and materialism which are the temptations of wealth, and generously give to educational, religious, and missionary effort in their own and less favored lands; that Germany must abandon her seemingly inbred brutality; that the men of Italy must attain a deeper religious consciousness; that Britain must dethrone the beer-god and France purge herself of atheism and licensed lust. All these are but indicative of an advancing stage when education, morality and religion itself shall have more and more to do with with the affairs of individuals and nations.

The end desired, although scarcely discerned except with the eye of faith, viewed in the light of the past is not impossible. It should be remembered that the purity and lasting influence of the Judaic religion was a creation in measured time, as was the perfecting of Greek culture, the remarkable fabric of Roman law and the free institutions of the British commonwealth. Even in a generation after the Civil war the attitude of the South toward slavery changed from approval to condemnation, and the German people have been wrought over and cast in harder mold within the lifetime of their reigning Cæsar. Whatever may be said, and with truth, of heroic qualities brought out by war, upon which German militarism lays so much stress, the evangel of the angels continues to be, "Peace on earth," and it was in lands then, as now, sounding with the tramp of armies that the prophet wrote: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. The wolf shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; they shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain."

## PEACE

The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion, to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

—PRESIDENT WILSON,

At Washington's Tomb, July 4, 1918.

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Were half the power that fills the world with terror,  
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts,  
Given to redeem the human mind from error,  
There were no need of arsenals or forts.

\* \* \* \* \*

Peace! and no longer from its brazen portals  
The blast of war's great organ shakes the skies,  
But beautiful as songs of the immortals  
The holy melodies of love arise.

—LONGFELLOW: from "The Arsenal at Springfield."

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